"...With the greatest respect possible to my Lord, Salami, JCA, I do not agree with the view expressed by His Lordship that only certified copies of public documents are admissible.

My Lord, Salami, JCA, seems to have relied on the case of Obadina family and Executors of Chief J.A. Ajao vs. Ambrose Family & ors. (1969) 1 NMLR 25 at 30, where the Supreme Court, per Coker, J.S.C. stated as follows: "The combined effect of the subsection is that in the case of public documents, the only type of secondary evidence permissible is a certified true copy of the document and none other. The document now marked exhibit "2" is not a certified copy but a Photostat copy and it is therefore inadmissible as secondary evidence of a public document which it purports to be. There was no objection to its admissibility when it was produced but it is not within the competence of parties to a case to admit by consent or otherwise a document which, by law, is inadmissible."

A critical examination of that case shows that what His Lordship, Coker, J.S.C. was considering was the admissibility of various types of secondary evidence and in particular a certified copy and a photocopy came to the conclusion that among the various types of secondary evidence of a public document, the only type that is in admissible is a certified true copy thereof. The consideration was not between the original i.e. primary and secondary evidence of a public document. The phrase "the only type of secondary evidence" does not seem to me to exclude primary evidence from being admissible.

Section 93 of the Evidence Act, provides that:- "the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or secondary evidence." Section 94(1) defines primary evidence as "the document itself". Section 96 of the Evidence Act provides that "documents must be proved by primary evidence," except in the Cases to be mentioned later. There is no section of the Evidence Act that provides that no primary evidence of a public document is admissible. Section 112 of the Act allows certified true copy to be produced in proof of the contents of public document or part of public document. I do not think the provision of section 112 of the Act renders the primary evidence of public document inadmissible in evidence. In my view, the net effect of sections 91(1)(a), 93, 94(1), 95, 97(1)(e) and 112 of the evidence is that the contents of public documents such as the report and the white paper in question may be proved by producing the originals themselves for the court to inspect as primary evidence. If the maker of the statement, as in this case had personal knowledge of the matter dealt with by the statement i.e. DW1, or prove by the production of their certified true copies as secondary evidence, the two documents being public documents.

By virtue of section 96 of the Evidence Act, it is my view that public documents are provable by their originals. It says:- "Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases herein after mentioned." Although section 112 allows certified true copies thereof to be used as well. It does not make original inadmissible. These sections of the Evidence Act in summary lay down that in proving the contents of documents; the emphasis is on the production of their originals i.e. their primary evidence. They however go on to provide that if the contents are to be proved by secondary evidence, a restricted type of secondary evidence only may be accepted i.e. certified copies in the case of public documents.

In Anatogu & ors vs. Igwe Iweka II & ors. (1995) 8 NWLR Part 415 page 547 at 572, The Supreme Court, per Uwais, J.S.C. (as he then was) talking on the mode for tendering public documents in Court stated inter alia, as follows:- "In my opinion, the documents could only be admitted in evidence if they satisfied the provisions of section 90 subsection 1 or section 112 of the Evidence Act quoted above. The latter section allowes for certified copies of the documents to be produced, but even then what were sought to be tendered in this case were not certified copies but the original public documents. Had the procedure under sections 110 and 111 been adhered to by the Respondents, the certified copies of the documents would have automatically become admitted in evidence by the trial Judge without P.W.1 giving evidence of them. In other words, the documents would have been directly admissible without any foundation being laid." It should be noted that sections 90 and 111 being referred to above are now sections 91 and 112 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 112 of the Laws of the Federation, 1990.

What the Lord Chief Justice of Nigeria is saying as quoted above is that public documents could be admitted in evidence either under section 91(1) or section 112 of the Evidence Act. If a party intends to tender under section 91(1) he must comply with the procedure under section 91(1) by producing the original document, provided the maker of the statement therein who had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement is called; or by complying with the provisions section 111 by producing a certified true copy of the document and tender it under section 112 of the Evidence Act.

It seems to me in the circumstance that the authority i.e. the case of Lawson v. Afani Continental Co. (Nig.) Ltd (supra) relied upon by the tribunal is very much incogrous and inconsistent with the two cases of the Supreme Court, namely:- Obadina family and Executors of Chief J.A. Ajiao v. Ambrose family & 7 ors (supra) and Philip Antagu vs. Igwe Iweka II (supra).

In the instant case on appeal, the Appellant as 1st Respondent at the trial tribunal, call DW1 as witness. DW1 was the Chairman of the Administrative Panel of Inquiry set up by the Borno State Government to investigate Revenue Generation and Utilization of the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council. He gave unchallenged evidence that he was the Chairman of the Panel of Inquiry set by the Borno State Government. He gave the names of all the members of the panel and stated how they carried out the assignment given to them. Indeed, he laid very good foundation for tendering of both the report of the panel and the Government white paper thereon accepting some of the recommendations of the panel. He has complied with guidelines for tendering original public documents contained in the case of Philip Anatogu & ors, vs. Igwe Iweka II & ors. (supra). In that regard, I am of the view that both original report of the panel and original Government white paper thereon are admissible and majority members of the tribunal were in grave error when they rejected the two documents."

It is evident that this Court in Daggash. V. Bulama (supra) overruled itself meaning therefore, that its earlier decision in Lawson v. Afani Continental Co. Ltd (supra) cannot take precedence over the latter decision of the Court."

Per ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A. in

(Pp. 41-45, paras. B-F)