“Section 26 (2) and 61 (3) of the Corrupt Practices Act provide:
26 (2) Prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation, or any authority to whom he shall delegate his authority, in any superior court of record so designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja under Section 61 (3) of this Act; and every prosecution for an offence under this Act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption, fraud or any other related offences shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation.
61 (3) The Chief Judge of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall, by order under his hand, designate a court or judge or such number of courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud or other related offences arising under this Act or any other laws prohibiting fraud, bribery or corruption; a court or judge so designated shall not, while being so designated, hear and determine any other cases provided that all cases of fraud, bribery or corruption pending in any court before the coming into force of this Act shall continue to be heard and determined by that court." (Emphasis mine)
It is evident from the plain and unambiguous words used in the two provisions reproduced above that it is the High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory that has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges brought under the Corrupt Practices Act. Section 26 (2) of the Act provides that the Attorney General of the Federation or of, a State may initiate charges under the Act in any superior court of record designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory. This is quite specific. If it was intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, the Legislature would have done so. I do not agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the Corrupt Practices Act is ultra vires Section 251 (1) & (3) of the Constitution.” PER K. M. O. KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.
PROOF - BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIAL
“The position of the law, which remains constant and inviolable, is that in order to secure a conviction in criminal proceedings, the prosecution has the onerous burden of establishing the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 135 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act 2011; Igabele Vs The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.975) 100; Iko Vs The State (2001) LPELR-1480 (SC) @ 48 A - B; Lori Vs The State (1980) 8 - 11 SC 81. This is in line with the presumption of innocence guaranteed to any person who is accused of committing a crime, as provided for in Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. The burden remains on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts.”
PER K. M. O. KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C. IN PROF. BUKAR BABABE V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA SC.883/2016
