"I have given due attention to the arguments of the parties in the appeal, and my understanding of the issue being contested is whether the lower Court, being the High Court of Lagos State had the requisite jurisdiction to hear and to determine the action in this suit in view of the stipulations in the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. Let me start by restating the trite position of the law, which is that jurisdiction is fundamental, for as stated by Bello CJN in the case of Utih vs. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 SCNJ 25, that a declaration by a Court dismissing or granting a relief, is based on the assumption of the existence of jurisdiction to make a valid and binding pronouncement in the matter. The declaration of lack of jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the claim is an admission of legal incompetence and impotence to make any such valid and binding declaration in the cause before it. In short a Court lacking in jurisdiction labors in vain, regardless of how well conducted the proceedings might be and the conclusions reached. The learned senior counsel on what determines the Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate on the plaint rightly pointed out that the claimants/plaintiffs claim as contained in the writ and statement of claim clothes the Court with the jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Thus Kutigi CJN in Ibrahim Abdulhamid vs. Talal Akar & Anor (2006) 13 NWLR (pt. 996) 127, on the issue, stated that: "It is settled and a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiffs claim or relief. In other words, it is the claim before the Court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether or not it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. See Western Steel Works Ltd vs. Iron & Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 49) 284; Tukur vs. Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517 and Adeyemi vs. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31." In doing so, the Court is enjoined to carefully examine and to understand the facts and the circumstances of the case in determining whether the claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court. See Dosumu vs. NNPC (2014) 6 NWLR (pt. 1403) 282. I have against this background carefully examined the statement of claim and in particular the reliefs being sought. It seems to me from the principal relief sought by the respondent before the lower Court: a. A declaration that the dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant on or about the 3rd day of February, 2006 was discriminatory on the ground of the claimants sex and that she was a nursing mother and the same was wrongful and unconstitutional, and the ancillary relief. b. A declaration that the defendant had no mandate or alternatively the defendant has no authority to debit the current account of the claimant with the sum of N1, 628, 209.64, stems from the belief by the claimant, that her right against discrimination on the ground of her sex was breached, leading to her wrongful and unconstitutional dismissal from the employment of the defendant.
I have equally considered and arrived at the conclusion that all the other reliefs sought owe their success or failure upon the success or failure of these principal reliefs and my humble but firm understanding of the appellants complaint before the lower Court is founded upon her belief that her fundamental right against discrimination, on the ground of her sex and as a nursing mother, as enshrined in Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, was breached by the respondents, leading to her dismissal from her employment. For ease of reference the Section provides: 42.-(1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not by reason only that he is such a person(a) be subjected either expressly by or in the practical application of any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the Government to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or political opinions are not made subject; or (b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or political opinion.
The clear implication of the appellants complaint before the lower Court, as can be clearly deduced is anchored on the fact that she was discriminated against, and thus sought succor in the provisions of Section 46 of the same Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, which provided that: 46.-(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress. Now the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is anchored on the provisions of Section 254 (c) (1) (a) (d) and (g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For ease of reference, the sections reads as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251-, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in relation to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matterA. Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; D. Relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer's association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine; G. Relating to or connected with any dispute arising from discrimination or sexual harassment at workplace..."
The learned counsel for the appellant is right in saying that the respondents claims clearly falls within the precincts of the sections reproduced above. The case of Echelunkwo John & 90 Ors vs. Igbo-Etiti Local Government Area (supra) cited by him settles the point. The learned senior counsel goes on to argue that even though the case under consideration was part heard, the decision was caught up by the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, which provides that: 11 (1) "In so far as jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court in respect of the causes or matters mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act, the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, or any other Court shall, to the extent that exclusive jurisdiction is so conferred upon the Court, cease to have jurisdiction In relation to such causes and matters. 11(2). Nothing in Subsection (1) of this Section shall affect the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to continue to hear and determine causes and matters which are part heard before the commencement of this Act and any proceedings in any such causes or matters, not determined or concluded at the expiration of one year after the commencement of this Act, shall abate." On whether this case ought to have abated after one year as argued by the learned counsel, I find the decision of Ogakwu JCA in Strand Nigeria Limited and Or vs. Mr Ngozi Ijeh (unreported) in Appeal with No. CA/&()/2012, delivered on the 10th day of March, 2017 very illuminating.
Therein my learned brother held that: "it is settled law that the jurisdiction of a Court is statutory and it is the Constitution or the statute creating a Court that sets out the jurisdiction of the Court... Equally trite law is that the substantive law governing a cause of action is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose. The procedural law governing the trial of an action is the adjectival law in force at the time of the trial of the action, unless there is a provision to the contrary. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an action is determined on the state of the law conferring jurisdiction at the point in time when the action was instituted and heard. Generally, the effect of a statute is prospective and not retrospective. So, Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution as amended/altered takes effect from its commencement date. The said section however made no provision in respect of cases already pending in Court as at its commencement date and whether such cases are to abate or continue." (Underlining mine) Furthermore, at page 9, Court held as follows: "Trial in this matter commenced on 24th July, 2009".
Therefore as at 4th March, 2000, the commencement date of Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution as amended/altered, the hearing in this matter had already commenced. Since trial had commenced before the commencement date of the said Section 254C, the said provisions... would not have the effect of preventing the lower Court from continuing with the matter." See also the cases of Mustapha vs. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 58) 539 @ 591 per Fabiyi JSC, NURTW and 1 Or vs. RTEAN (2012) 10 NWLR (pt. 1307) 70 at 192 - 193, Obiuweubi vs. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (pt. 1247) 465 per Rhodes Vivour JSC. This being the case, the claimant by virtue of Section 46 of the same Constitution, can and rightly approached the State High Court under Section 272 of the CFRN 1999 to ventilate his grievance pertaining to the breach of her constitutional right in the High Court of a State where the breach or anticipated breach occurred. The breach having occurred before the promulgation or amendment to the CFRN, 1999, by the addition of Sub-section C to Section 254, which amendment has no retrospective effect, same cannot deprive the Lagos State High Court of the jurisdiction to hear and to determine the claim of the respondent before it to conclusion. It is apparent that the amendment to Section 254 of the Constitution did not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court retrospectively, and since the constitutional powers of the High Court cannot be ousted by statute, and in view of the ratio in the case of NURTW vs. RTEAN (supra), the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be curtailed by Section 11 of the National Industrial Act in the circumstance. Against this background, it is my humble but firm view that the lower Court was properly imbued with the requisite jurisdiction to hear and to determine the claimant's case."
Per BARKA, J.C.A. IN STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ADEGBITE CITATION: (2018) LPELR-43508(CA)
