"It is trite that for a break in causation to occur, there has to be in evidence that some other person or event occurred which could have caused the death or further injury to the deceased after the time that the injury was inflicted on the deceased by the accused and the death of the deceased. What occurred must be an intervening act that would have been in such proportion as to duplicate or exacerbate the injury inflicted by the Appellant and could now become the cause of the deceased's death. Paragraph 623, Page 211 of AN ALMANAC OF CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL RESTATEMENTS volume 3 explains thus: Where although act of accused constitutes a cause sine qua non of (or necessary condition for) the death of the victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim's death, thereby reliving the accused of criminal responsibility. This is what is referred to as novusactusinterveniens where such effect is accepted. In homicide cases, the burden of proving the cause of death lies squarely on the prosecution and not the defence; cause of death must be proved with certainty and this must be due to the act or omission of the accused. It is not a matter of probability. The last link of causation causacausansis important as an intervening cause, novusactusinterveniens that breaks the chain of causation and would be resolved in favour of an acquittal for the actus reus as it gives rise to a benefit of doubt since there would be no certainty on the proximate cause of death. Where there are two possible causes of death, there would be a doubt to the accused's benefit: Aiguoreghian v State (2004) FWLR (Pt. 185) 716 @748-9 S.C.; (2004) 1 S.C(Pt.1) 65 @ 73. From the facts contained on the record, there is no evidence of an intervening act. The portion of evidence referred to by the Appellant is insufficient to break the chain of causation already set in motion by the act of the Appellant. The fact that the deceased was not quickly attended to and had bled a lot before receiving medical attention cannot detract from the fact that it was the Appellant who caused the factual injury which led to his death. The Appellant and all the witnesses called are not Doctors except for Dr. Ohayi Robsam who tendered the medical report which stated thus: "Presented to us with a history of stabbing to the back. Examination reveals extensive hemorrhage both externally and internally. Patients condition progressively deteriorated with death eventually resulting." The logical conclusion to draw from the above evidence is that the Appellant's act of stabbing the deceased caused the hemorrhage and other complications, ultimately leading to the death of the deceased the following day after the incident. See: Edoko v The State (2015) LPELR-24402(SC) (Pp.33-34, Paras G-B), Ajunwa v The State (1988) LPELR-308(SC) (Pp. 10-11, Paras G-E); (1988) NWLR Pt.89 Pg.380 Under Section. 314 of the Criminal Procedure Code applicable in the North and not Enugu State where this crime was committed; it is only where the deceased died a year and a day after the attack by the accused that there can be said to be a break in the chain of causation. I am just using that as an analogy to show that generally there cannot be a break when death accrued a day after the incident as in this case. I do not agree that the fact that the deceased was carried from one hospital to the other and was not quickly attended to and he bled a lot before he was treated can be different intervening acts that broke the chain of causation. The jurisprudence on this issue is that the accused has to be given the benefit of doubt if another event apart from the incident involving him could have caused the death of the deceased, particularly where it occurred just before or just after the incident with the accused. Consequently, the argument of the appellant on this point fails; the Appellant and none other caused the death of the deceased."

Per OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.IN OCHI v. STATE CITATION: (2018) LPELR-45064(CA)