Circumstance where a party cannot be heard to complain of being denied the right to fair hearing
"The complaint that the short adjournment of a few hours before the delivery of its judgment by the Court of Appeal, just like the Court of Appeal's preference of the 1st respondent's sole issue to the three issues formulated by the appellant, appears to me to be complaints attacking the manner the Court of Appeal exercised its undoubted discretion.
An appeal attacking the exercise of discretion should ordinarily have been brought upon leave first sought and obtained: PRUDENT BANK PLC v. OBARAKI (2012) NWLR (Pt.128S) 504 at 513. I have not seen any evidence of such leave in this appeal. Be that as it may, this Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Court of Appeal of its undoubted discretion unless the appellant shows that the discretion was not exercised judicially and judiciously; LAFFERI NIG. LTD. v. NAL MERCHANT BANK PLC (2015) LPELR - 24726 (SC). The interference is very seldom and only in exceptional cases where there has been manifest and obvious miscarriage of justice: ODUSOTE V. ODUSOTE (1971) ALL NLR 219. The appellant, citing Section 258(1) of the Constitution and the cases of AGBANELO v. U.B.N. (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt.666) 540 and UNONGO v. APER AKU (1983) 2 SCNLR 332 at 352, submits that the decision of the 5 justices of the Court of Appeal delivered only in a few hours whereas they had 3 months to do so was rather a hasty and "hurried judgment at the expense of a carefully reasoned out judgment", particularly that the appeal was determined on only one issue.
Let me debunk some misconceptions inherent in these submissions. What is important is not how long it takes to write a judgment, but how articulate the judgment is. It is also not the quantum of issues formulated that determines the fate of an appeal but the aptness of the issues to the dispute. A single issue, properly formulated and direct to the dispute or controversy, can (and often times it does) resolve the dispute.
It is only in the academic world that disputes or controversies are used to identify or find issues. In adjudication issues are formulated for the resolution of real disputes.
Section 258(1) of the Constitution must have been cited in error. As pointed out in the Brief of the 1st respondent. The appellant, apparently, intends to refer to Section 294(1) of the same Constitution that provides - Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof. The mischief the provision intends to address and stamp out is delay in justice delivery.
Section 294(1) is neither an antidote nor the antithesis of Section 36(1) of the same Constitution that prescribes, inter alia that in the determination of his civil rights and obligation a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law.
I do not see how a judgment delivered by the Court of appeal within a few hours after the conclusion of the final addresses by the parties ordinarily violates the right to fair hearing guaranteed to the appellant.
Appeals at the Court of Appeal are heard on briefs of arguments previously filed and served on the parties. The briefs are available to the justices of the Court to peruse and appreciate the issues therein long before a date is appointed for the hearing of the appeal on the said brief. In this appeal, we have not been told that the briefs were only available to the five (5) Justices of the Court of Appeal just on the day the appeal was heard.
In view of Section 285 of the amended 1999 Constitution, UNONGO v. APER AKU (supra) no longer represents good law. In the UNONGO case Section 140 of the Electoral Act, 1983 intended to hasten the pace of the administration of justice in election matters was held to be unconstitutional. Section 285 (6) & (7) of the Constitution, as amended, have restored what the annulled Section 140 of the Electoral Act, 1983 had intended to achieve.
Speedy trial, in criminal proceedings, is an aspect of the rights to personal liberty and fair hearing guaranteed, respectively, by Sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution: OKECHUKWU BENSON v. C.O.P. (2013) LPELR - 21212 (CA).
It appears to me the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal, in this case, had in mind what the learned Idoko, J (of blessed memory) had in mind in MORGAN OKETA OGWU & ANOR. v. THE STATE (1981/82) BNLR 31, - when he stated: This speedy trial guaranteed under our Constitution is a valuable one and it is armed at serving three purposes, namely:
(1) it protects an accused against prolonged imprisonment;
(2) it neutralizes the anxiety and public suspicion which leaving a case hanging on the neck of an accused engenders; and
(3) it prevents the means of proving the innocence (or otherwise) as a result of loss of witnesses and dulling away of (their) memory.
Of greater value for speedy trial, when the Court is aware that the accused person is in custody, is the prevention of his punishment before his trial and conviction.
per Ejembi Eko JSC in
