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When an election petition is said to have been filed out of time

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"By law, the date on which an event occurred is not counted in the process of calculating the period enshrined in any legislation. In the same vein, where the last day slated for the happening of an event is a public holiday, the limited period is extended or prolonged to the next working day.

The provision of section 15(2) (b) of the Interpretation Act is a living proof. In the case of Aderedoru v Akinremi (1985)2 NWLR (Pt.10)787 at 794, the court of Appear, Ibadan Division, delivered a judgment on 10/04/1985 while the appellants lodged an appeal against it on 10/07/1985.

The applicants/respondents raised a preliminary objection to the appeal, before the Supreme court, that it was filed out of time by one day contrary to the provision of section 31(2) of the Supreme court Act, 1960- which provided for three months for an appeal against a final decision.

The preliminary objection was overruled. Aniagolu, JSC, opined: "It would follow that in computing the period for the filing of the appeal in this matter the date - 10th April, 1985 - on which the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment must be excluded. The calculation thus begins on 11th April, 1985 and three months from hence must end at midnight of 10th July, 1995. The one day by which Mr. Ajayi has said the appellants were out of time becomes the one day which by section 15(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1964, must be excluded in the computation, on the, footing that the appeal was filed on 10th July, 1995. The principle of this exclusion of the day of the happening of the event has become a principle of general acceptance."

By the same token, in the case of Yusuf v Obasanjo (2003)16 NWLR (Pt.847) 554 at 629-630, Uwaifo, JSC, observed: "Section 132 (of the Electoral Act, 2002) provides that: "An election petition may be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared."

It is not in dispute that the presidential election result in question was declared on 22 April, 2003. The petitioners in this case had 30 days within which to appeal against it. The 30 days will be calculated from 23 April to end on 22 May, 2003. Section 15(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act... makes similar provision . ... The petition was filed on 2 May, well within time."

Similarly, in the recent case of Ezeigwe v Nwawulu (2010) a NWLR (Pt.1183) 159 at 196, Onnoghen, JSC, re-echoed this hallow principle of law. He stated: ". . . The law is now settled that in calculating or computing time stipulated by statute, generally the first day of the period will be excluded from the reckoning while the last day will be included except, where the last day is a public holiday in which case the end of the following day, which is not a public holiday, will be included - see section 15(2) of the Interpretation Act ...."

The wisdom behind the exclusion of the day of the occurrence of an event, in computation of days, was succinctly explained by Oputa, JSC, in the case of Akeredolu v Akinremi (supra), at pages 804-805, in these illuminating words: ". . . Excluding the date on which the event happened that gave rise to the computation accords with good sound common-sense, otherwise one will be faced with the difficulty of calculating a fraction of a day as a day.

It is my humble view that unless expressly so provided by statute, to argue that a fraction of a day is equal to a whole day involves the ineradicable fallacy of making a part equal to a whole. Such an interpretation would be an assault on common-sense and would do violence to the plain meaning of words. To avoid regarding part of a day as a whole day, the day on which the event happened should be excluded from the computation. The judgment now appealed against could not have been delivered at 12 mid-night of 9th April 1985.

If it were delivered any time after sum (when the courts usually begin sitting) then the present Applicants are being allowed less than the 3 months granted them by s.31 (a) of the Supreme Court Act, 1960."

 

Per OGBUINYA, J.C.A in ALH. KABIR AHMED KOFA & ANOR v. ABUBAKAR LAWAL KAITA & ORS
CITATION: (2011) LPELR-CA/K/EP/NA/34/2008


   
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