"The law is that a general provision in statute gives way to a specific provision. In other words, specific provisions override the powers of the general provisions. The Supreme Court in the case of JAMES Vs. INEC (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1474) 538 at 605 paras A-H & 606 paras A-F as per, Muhammad, JSC; "I am unable to agree with the learned senior counsel at the unambiguous forgoing provision of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, it is the trial Court by virtue of Section 251(1)(a) and (f) of the 1999 Constitution that has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine his claim. The grounds of the appellant's claim gleaned from the relevant paragraphs of his amended originating summons and supporting affidavits are the fact of the 3rd Respondent non qualification to contest the 3/12/2011 gubernatorial election and by extension his failure to secure majority of the lawful votes cast at the election. It is the appellant's contention that the 3rd respondent not being candidate at the election did not lawfully contest the election. One hastens to state that by the combined effect of Section 285 (2) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution, and Sections 133 (1) and 138 (1)(a) & (c) of the Electoral Act, 2010, these are grounds on the basis of which 3rd respondent's election and return may be questioned within twenty one days of the winner's return and only by means of an election petition over which the Election Tribunal, to the exclusion of any other, has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine. Appellant's action filed almost two months after the election and return of the 3rd respondent is certainly not a pre-election matter that could have, for that reason, lawfully been commenced at the trial Court. See Amaechi v INEC (supra) and Hassan V. Aliyu (supra). Even as an election petition, appellant's claim is outrageously belated. My lords, while interpreting Section 232 (1) Vis a vis section 251 (1)(a) (b) and (q) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) in appeal No. SC 20/2008 between The Attorney General of Lagos State Vs Attorney General of the Federation and 35 others delivered on the 11th day of April, 2014, reported in (2014) NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217 relied on the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal in Mrs. F. Bangboye V Administrator General (1954) 14 WACA 616 at 619 and held thus:"Both Sections 232(1) and 251(1)(a), (b) and (q) are authored by the same legislators and make up the same 1999 Constitution. It out rightly hits an effective interpreter of these constitutional provisions that Section 251 (1) (a), (b) and (q) is not only subsequent in sequence to but more specific and special in tenor than Section 232 (1) of the Constitution. A reasonable construction of these provisions also admits the finding that the framers of the Constitution in providing for the first of the two provisions had contemplated the subsequent provision and in providing the subsequent one had not forgotten that the earlier provision had already been put in place. The specific jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court under Section 251(1)(a), (b) and (q) is exercisable notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution including the original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under the earlier Section 232(1) of the same Constitution." The same principle applies to the instant case as well. The two Courts are correct in their findings that the trial Court lacks the jurisdiction of determining appellant's claim which question the election and return of the 3rd respondent by virtue of Section 251(1) (q) and (r) simply because the return is the administrative decision or action of the 1st respondent, INEC an agency of the Federal Government. Rather, the Election Petition Tribunal had the exclusive jurisdiction of determining appellant's claim. This must be so because Section 285, being a latter provision to Section 251 in the very same Constitution, addedly creates a special tribunal/Court and vest it with specific and exclusive jurisdiction. The latter section must prevail over the earlier provision." The appellant had placed heavy reliance on the cases of LADOJA Vs. INEC and NYAKO Vs. A.S.H.A (supra) in arguing that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to interpret Section 272(3) of the Constitution. The facts of these two cases are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. While the two cases above relate to the issue of impeachment, the appellants in the instant case are challenging the conduct of the Cross River State governorship election, which the 1st respondent conducted. When the 1st respondent issued notice of election followed by political parties nominating their candidates, the appellants folded their arms while these processes were going on until after the election to challenge propriety of the election by a declaration that the said election was null and void. The Supreme Court has stressed that in election related matters, time is of the essence and any person having issues with the preparation of a scheduled election must act promptly and timeously, else he will lose whatever justiciable right he may otherwise stand to have regarding the election. In ALHASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWlR Pt. 1223 Pg. 547 @ Pg 599 paras B- F, per Onnonghen JSC(as he then was) held thus: "It is settled law that in an election or election related matter, time is of the essence, I will add that the same applies to pre-election matters are sui-generis, very much unlike ordinary criminal or civil proceedings. Appellant ought to have instituted the action, soon after the substitution to keep his Interest in the political contest alive, but he did not. If he had, but the election went on and the 1st Respondent sworn in as the Governor, by the authority of the decision Amaechi vs INEC (supra) Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution would have been rendered a toothless bulldog. I hold the view that at the time the appellant decided to go to Court in the circumstances of this case, the question of nomination by way of substitution which is a pre-election matter has ceased to exist, leaving only the election proper to be questioned and the proper place to do so is the election tribunal. If the situation in this case is encouraged it will breed uncertainty in the polity when a person may wake up a year or more after an election and swearing in of a president or governor to challenge his nomination by way of substitution for the election that brought him to power or he may even do so after the tenure of the office of official concern which attitude ought not to be encouraged by the law." The law is trite that cases predicated upon pre-election and election related matters are sui generis and dissimilar with ordinary civil or criminal proceedings. The forum for such proceedings also depends on the time of filing the initiating process. The holding of an election marks the barrier between pre-election and post-election matters. Thus, once an election has been conducted and a winner declared and presented with certificate of return, the only Court with jurisdiction to entertain any complaints regarding the validity or otherwise of such election is the appropriate election tribunal established for that purpose. As provided by Section 133(1) of the Electoral Act, no election and return at an election shall be questioned in any manner other than by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return presented to the competent tribunal or Court in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party. An election matter is sui generis, neither seen as civil proceedings in the ordinary sense nor as criminal proceedings. Thus it is imperative that in an election petition, the procedure laid down in the Electoral Act and related statutes must be strictly complied with. While pre-election matters can only be heard in the regular Courts, post-election matters are to be heard by Election Petition Tribunals established by Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The questions and reliefs sought to be determined by the Court below were clearly questions dealing with the validity or otherwise of the election conducted by the 1st Respondent in April 2015 and return of the 3rd and 4th Respondents as the elected Governor and Deputy Governor of Cross River State respectively. I am of the firm view that the lower Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a post-election matter which the Appellants' case was. The issue is resolved against the Appellants and further renders the Appellants' other issues insignificant. The lower Court was right upholding the preliminary objection and declining jurisdiction in the post election matter."

Per MUKHTAR, J.C.A.IN APC & ORS v. INEC & ORS CITATION: (2018) LPELR-44286(CA)