Whether it is only the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to entertain any matter involving a Receiver/Manager.
"The provision of CAMA referred to does not empower the Receiver/manager to arbitrarily lock up the premises of other persons or detain their properties in the purported exercise of his power.
The Appellants further argued that because the conduct complained of in the statement of Claim is attributable to the Receiver/Manager, the Federal High court must necessarily have jurisdiction. This argument to me is preposterous, it does not hold. This negates the capacity of the High Court to entertain a matter that is clearly within its jurisdiction. The Respondent seems to be suggesting that the Federal High court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any matter involving a Receiver/Manager or that the mere mention of his name in a claim makes it a proper one for the Federal High court to have jurisdiction to entertain.
The position of the law is admirably captured and enhanced in the case of 7up BOTTLING CO. LIMITED & ORS v. ABIOLA and SONS LIMITED (supra). where the acts and conduct complained of are that of a Receiver/Manager. It was similarly argued on behalf of the Appellants in that case that because it was a Receiver/Manager who sold the Respondent's properties, it was a matter which bordered on the operation of the companies and Allied Matters Act and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
This Court Per ONU JSC discountenanced this argument and held that since there was an extant injunction restraining the Receiver/Manager from selling the Respondent's properties, the sale of those properties amounted to conversion which is an action in tort over which the Kwara State High Court has jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for the Respondent made a point in his brief that the position of the Receiver/Manager in the 7UP case (supra) when compared with the instant case, is quite stronger than that of the 1st Appellant herein because the Receiver/Manager in the said 7up case was actually appointed in respect of the assets of the Respondent which he sold wrongly. In the case at hand the 1st Appellant though appointed a Receiver of the 2nd Appellant but not in respect of the Respondent's office which he locked up and its good in the ware house which he detained in the purported exercise of his functions. In other words the Respondent is a different and separate entity from the 2nd Appellant over which the 1st Appellant was appointed a Receiver/Manager.
Also in TRADE BANK PLC v. BENILUX LIMITED (2003), 9 NWLR (pt.825) 416, this court in considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High court in matters provided under the section 230 (1) (d) of the constitution (suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993, held that although there is no relationship of customer and banker between the respondent and the appellant which fact would ordinarily have conferred jurisdiction on the High court, the respondent's case therein, was simply a tort of conversion and therefore actionable in the High Court of a State.
Therefore in the light of the foregoing, I hold contrary view to the position taken by the appellant's counsel in his submission that the court below "fell into grave error when it held that the claim is not related to or arose from performance of the duties and powers of the 1st, Appellant as Receiver/Manager of the 2nd Appellant."
It is my respectful view that the paragraphs of the statement of claim, as set out above support the decision of the lower court since the Respondent that it is merely a tenant and therefore a different and separate entity from the 2nd Appellant which is in receivership."
Per GALADIMA, J.S.C in ADETONA v IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD. [2011] 7 NWLR (PT. 1247) 535
