"In a nutshell, what is being asked of this Court here and now is whether the decision of the Investments and Securities Tribunal in declining jurisdiction to hear the appellant's originating application and which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal was correct regard being had to the provisions of Section 284 (1) (a) of the Investment and Securities Act 2007. The provisions of the said section are set out hereunder, as follows:"284 (1) The Tribunal shall, to the exclusion of any other Court of law or body in Nigeria, exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine any question of law or dispute involving; (a) A decision or determination of the commission in the operation and application of this Act and in particular, relating to any dispute: (i) Between Capital Market Operators; (ii) Between Capital Market Operators and their clients; (iii) Between an Investor and a Securities Exchange or Capital Trade point or Clearing and Settlement Agency; (iv) Between Capital Market Operators and self regulatory organization." That learned counsel for the appellant contends, that section is a negation of the provision of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended provides that: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality." What is called for at this point is the interpretation of the provisions of Section 284(1)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Investments and Securities Act 2007 in relation to the jurisdiction of the trial Tribunal. The provisions of Section 284 are clear and unambiguous and so have to be interpreted within the ordinary and natural meaning. I rely on African Newspapers of Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 137 at 156; Owena Bank Nig Plc v. Nigeria Stock Exchange Limited (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.515) page 1; Amasike v. Reg. Gen. C.A.C. (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1211) 337; National Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Weide & Co Nig Ltd (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.465) 150. The principles of interpretation of statues being well settled, it has to be said that the jurisdiction of a Court or Tribunal is not inferred or imagined but statutory. This follows the fact that Courts are set up under the Constitution, Decrees, Act, Laws and Edicts and these are the instruments that cloak the Courts with the powers and jurisdiction of adjudication. Therefore where the statues have not donated jurisdiction to a Court or Tribunal, the Court cannot operate as jurisdiction is not endowed by consent of parties being that jurisdiction is confined, limited and circumscribed by the statute creating it. See Oloruntoba - Oju v. Abdul- Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt.117) 83 at 125. Getting back on track to the matter at hand, the claims against the 1st- 4th respondents resolve around infractions or breaches of the provisions of the Investments and Securities Act while the claim against the 5th respondent is for an order of Court compelling the 5th respondent to sanction the respondents, 1st - 4th for breach of the Investment and Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Commission Rules and the Act. The clear interpretation or purport of what is on ground is that without a decision by the 5th respondent (the Commission) the trial Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain the originating application filed by the appellant against the 1st - 4th respondents. Another way of saying what I am trying to impart is that the condition precedent to the activation of the jurisdiction of the trial Tribunal is that a decision or determination of the matter would have been done by the 5th respondent, the Securities and Exchange Commission firstly. The conclusion therefore is that the Court below was right to hold that the trial Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's claim against the 1st - 4th respondents."

Per PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.in  OKOROCHA v. UBA BANK & ORS CITATION: (2018) LPELR-45122(SC)