"Now, the general common law rule is that a person in contempt cannot be heard in the cause unless he purges himself of the contempt, Group Danone and Anor v. Voltic (Nig) Ltd (2008) LPELR 1341 (SC) 21; B-D; [2008] 7 NWLR (pt. 1087) 637; (2008) 34 NSCQR (pt. 1) 40. However, that ancient prescription is now subject to certain exceptions.

Thus, it is now tolerably settled that where a defendant, in a cause, challenges the validity of an order directed against him, either by way of an appeal or other application, he cannot be proceeded against for contempt of that order unless and until the issue of its legality is settled one way or the other, Onwochei Odogwu v. Olemeoku Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt 225) 539, 554. Gordon v. Gordon (1904) All ER 163.

This re-statement has even become necessary now having regard to the distinctive attribute of contempt as sui generis, Boyo v. The State (1970) All NLR 316; (1970) LPELR - 797 (SC) 4- 5; C-A; Oswald on Contempt Committal and Attachment, 17; John C, Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (London: Professional Books Ltd. 1972) 44 et seq; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2005) 4 WRN 1, 15; Ifekwe v. Mgbako [1990] 3 NWLR (pt. 140) 588, 593; Bonnie v. Gold (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 465) 230, 238; Okeke v. A.G. Anambra State (1997) 9 NWLR (pt. 519) 123, 140.